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Why Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Have Failed to Pay Their Debt?
An empirical investigation
MENBERE Workie Tiruneh* 
„The debt crisis can be studied as a problem in epidemiology.
A powerful virus, high world interest rate, hit the population of
capital importing developing countries in the 1980s. Some coun-
tries succumbed to the virus, having to reschedule their debt on
an emergency basis, while others did not. And of those countries
that arrived for emergency treatment, some recovered sufficiently
to enter the period of quiet convalescence, while others are still
suffering from febrile seizures in the IMF’s intensive care unit.“
(Sachs – Berg, 1988, p. 1)
1. Introduction
The external debt crisis of developing countries’ is believed to be one of
the major challenges of the new millennium. As Eatwell and Taylor (2000,
in: (Dymski, 2002)) express it, “international debt crisis has become a defi-
ning feature of the contemporary world economy”.1 In this regard, McFad-
den, et al. (1985, in (Smith, et al., 1985)) among others, argue that the pri-
mary question in international debt crisis is why indebted countries failed
to meet their debt-service obligations. The late 1980s and the 1990s wit-
ness that developing countries in general and HIPCs (heavily indebted poor
countries) in particular have suffered from chronic debt-servicing difficul-
ties.2 Though it is generally believed that external debt helps countries that
are suffering from capital deficiency to achieve accelerated economic growth,
once this financial gap becomes unmanageable, the past-accumulated ex-
ternal debt is likely to provoke further external borrowing, creating a vi-
cious circle. This obviously creates a gloomy picture on future growth pro-
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1 As they put it, „the past 8 years, a period of virtually unregulated cross-border financial flows,
have witnessed 8 major episodes of international debt and financial crises: the 1994–95 Mexi-
can “Tequila” crisis, the 1997–98 Asian financial crises, the 1998–99 run on the Brazilian real,
the 1998–99 Russian ruble (long-term credit crisis), the 2000 Turkish crisis, the 2001–02 melt-
down of the Argentine economy, the 2002 attack on the Brazilian real, and the 2002 Uruguayan
collapse“.
2 The debt-servicing difficulty in fact became apparent in August 1982, after Mexico’s official
announcement that it could no longer manage to continue servicing its external debt. This was
the end to creditworthiness of most poor countries. Fafchamps (1996, p. 315) defines debt cri-
ses in terms of the ability to pay, where he argues that a country defaults on its debt because
it has run out of foreign exchange.
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-service obligations, which is exactly the current experience of the poorest
nations of the world, earning the new name „HIPCs“.
The debt-servicing difficulties of indebted poor countries are remarkable.
For instance, based on the (World Bank, 2000), interest arrears as a ratio
to total long-term debt outstanding for SSA(Sub-Saharan Africa) and HIPCs
in 1989 represent 5.3 % and 7 %, respectively. In 1998, this ratio increased
to 11 % and 9 % respectively. In 1989, principal arrears as a share of total
long-term outstanding for SSA and HIPCs were around 10 % and 13 % re-
spectively. In 1998, this ratio rose to 11% for SSAand nearly 24% for HIPCs.
This is in contrast to 3 % for EAP (East Asia and the Pacific) 1.2 % for LAC
(Latin America and the Caribean) – see Table 1.
From Table 1 it is also apparent that HIPCs average principal arrears on
loans reached more than 8 % of its total external debt in 1984–90, which
rose to nearly 20 % in the 1991–98 period. In contrast, other developing
countries have lower problems by far. Similarly, this ratio on average
reached about 26 % of HIPCs’ GNP, a clear indication that this group has
not managed to meet its international debt obligations. This ratio for other
developing countries, again, on average, was around 1 % in 1984–90 and
around 1.5 % in the 1991–98 periods, respectively. Similarly, interest ar-
rears on loans are higher for HIPCs relative to other low and middle-in-
come countries. The ratio of interest arrears to GDP reached around 5 % in
the 1984–89, that nearly doubled in the 1991–98 period.
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TABLE 1 Arrears and Rescheduling (in % of total external debt (EDT) and GNP)
Debt crisis indicators
Heavily indebted poor countries All developing countries
1984–90 1991–98 1984–90 1991–98
Total amount of debt rescheduled
(% of EDT)  3.05 2.12 4.75 2.68
Principal rescheduled  1.60 0.98 1.46 0.90
Principal forgiven  0.65 1.01 0.22 0.20
Interest rescheduled  n.a. 0.57 n.a. 0.54
Interest forgiven  0.07 0.26 0.03 0.04
Debt stock rescheduled  0.38 0.21 2.78 1.08
Debt stock reduction  0.08 0.65 0.61 0.50
Interest arrears on LDOD  4.77 8.34 1.91 2.21
Principal arrears on LDOD  8.25 19.22 2.87 4.37
Total amount of debt rescheduled
2.65 2.80 1.66 1.00 (% of GNP)
Principal rescheduled  1.38 1.31 0.50 0.33
Principal forgiven  0.65 1.36 0.08 0.07
Interest rescheduled  n.a. 0.76 n.a. 0.20
Interest forgiven  0.07 0.34 0.01 0.01
Debt stock rescheduled  0.33 0.27 0.99 0.41
Debt stock reduction  0.08 0.82 0.21 0.18
Interest arrears on LDOD  4.36 11.30 0.65 0.82
Principal arrears on LDOD  7.65 25.96 0.99 1.64
Total external debt (EDT) to GNP ratio 87.95 134.36 34.13 37.53
Source: own calculations based on (World Bank, 2000)
(World Bank, 2001)
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the failure of indebted countries in the 1980s and 1990s to fully service
their contractual external debt obligations.3 The remainder of the paper is
divided into seven parts: Part 2 presents a brief summary of the factors
that drive countries to debt crises situations. Part 3 summarizes some of
the past empirical studies in this area. Part 4 discusses the empirical spe-
cification of the model used to figure out the factors that cause the debt
crisis. Part 5 briefly introduces the data and variables that are included
in the regression. Part 6 presents results and the coresponding discussion.
Finally, part 7 concludes and presents the possible policy implications of
this study.
2. Factors Affecting Debt-repayment Capacity: A Theoretical
Review
Following McFadden, et al. (1985, in (Smith – Cuddington, 1985, p. 188)),
among others, generally a country is said to be in a debt repayment crisis
if it has arrears on principal or interest, higher-tranche IMF arrangements,
or rescheduling requests. From the figures in Table 2, it is apparent that
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3 Most of the theoretical explanations on the debt crisis in the preceding chapter are relevant
to this chapter. We will mainly focus on the empirical counterpart of the explanation for the
debt payment difficulties of indebted nations in the past two decades.
TABLE 2 Definitions of the Variables and Their Sources
Variables Definitions Sources
TDSX Total debt service (scheduled) to exports  Global Development Finance, CD-ROM, 
ratio (lagged by one year) 2000, World Bank
RESIMP Reserves to imports ratio  Global Development Finance, CD-ROM,
(lagged by year) 2000, World Bank
LGDP Log of real GDP (PPP-adjusted)   Database for Global Development 
(lagged by one year)  Network, World Bank, Easterly William
and Mirvat Sewadeh (2002)
GDPG Annual growth rate GDP  Database for Global Development 
(PPP, and deflated by 1990 US CPI)  Network, World Bank, Easterly William 
(lagged by one year) and Mirvat Sewadeh (2002)
IMPGDP Ratio of imports to GDP  Global Development Finance, CD-ROM, 
(lagged by one year) 2000, World Bank
OECDG Growth of OECD trade partners  Database for Global Development 
(lagged by one year) Network, World Bank, Easterly William
and Mirvat Sewadeh (2002)
LTOTG The percentage change in the terms  Database for Global Development 
of trade  Network, World Bank, Easterly William
(lagged by one year) and Mirvat Sewadeh (2002)
CAPTDS The share of aggregate net resource  Global Development Finance, CD-ROM, 
flows to total debt service (a proxy  2000, World Bank
for capital inflows) lagged by one year
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seas borrowing into growth and ultimately service their external debt. How-
ever, although many of the indebted poor countries were in extremely dif-
ficult situations, they in principle remained committed to repay their
external debt obligations. This is in contrast to the debt crisis in the 1930s,
where virtually every Latin American country unilaterally suspended ser-
vicing its external bond obligations (Sachs, 1986)4. It appears that
rescheduling rather than default is mutually beneficial both for debtors
and for creditors. Marchesi (2000, p. 3) argues in this line. Rescheduling
is ”a mechanism which not only allows debtors not to default on their loans
and remain in the international financial system but also prevents credi-
tors from facing the whole consequences of a financial crisis“. However, it
appears that the hidden reason behind rescheduling rather than default
is something more than that. As Sachs (1986, p. 398) argues, the reschedul-
ing in the 1980s was indeed in the interest of creditors, where he stresses
that creditors during these periods used the leverage of multilateral fi-
nancial institutions to make sure that debtors wouldn’t interrupt servic-
ing their debt. In effect, the creditor governments have endorsed debt
rescheduling rather than debt relief.
While this is generally true, the main thing left unexplained is why de-
veloping countries fail to pay back their external debt in the first place. 
The factors that are chosen vary from author to author. McFadden et al.
(1985, in (Smith – Cuddington, 1985, p. 186)) summarize the broader group
of factors on which we base our empirical analysis (see Table 2).
2.1 Factors in the World Economy
These are factors identified as beyond the help of developing countries
that may to a great extent increase the likelihood of indebted countries to
reschedule their contractual debt obligations. Following McFadden (1985)
such factors may include but not be limited to a price increase in „non-com-
pressible“ imports, the deterioration in the terms of trade of developing
countries’ major export items, recession in industrialized countries, and
volatility in trade.
2.2 Domestic Factors
These are factors that are in the full control of indebted countries them-
selves. These may include shock to the productive capacity of developing
nations as the result of economic or non-economic factors, poor economic
management by the government of an indebted country (which may include
all forms of economic distortions), poor investment strategies (where the re-
turns of the investment are by far lower than the cost of foreign capital),
unsustainable growth strategies, and speculation and capital flight. These
127 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 55, 2005, ã. 3-4
4Sachs (1986, p.410) points out that the major difference between the 1930sand 1980sseems
to be the absence of „hegemonic“ power in the 1930s, while this gap was filled by the Uni-
ted States in the 1980s. In this context default in the 1980s would mean sanctions, seizure
of assets and other forms of punishments (a cut in foreign aid and trade sanctions, for in-
stance).
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nues, and ultimately wipe out the repayment potential of indebted coun-
tries.
2.3 Factors Affecting the Supply of Credit
These are factors that directly or indirectly affect the supply of credit to
indebted countries. Such factors include: A rise in interest payments due to
higher real interest rates in industrialized countries, an increase in amor-
tization due to a decline in maturities and an increase in the ratio of 
the short term debt, an increase in competition from other developed and
oil exporting countries, limited capacity of governments to guarantee debt,
and erratic behavior of creditors induced by institutional rules on exposure,
and distortion in incentives of loan managers and panics are all believed to
be detrimental to the repayment capacity of indebted nations.
There obviously are reverse causality issues across some of the factors
that are just mentioned. For instance, among the external factors, the re-
cession in industrialized countries may be the cause for the deterioration
in the terms of trade of developing countries key export items. Similarly,
this may also be the case that the fall in the terms of trade will force de-
veloping countries to reschedule rather than fully service their contractual
debt obligation and demand for further borrowing, which may reduce 
the financial transfers to the industrialized countries. Under the assump-
tion of substantially larger debtors, this may also cause economic slow down
in industrialized countries themselves. Moreover, it is not always easy to
distinguish precisely some of the domestic and external factors, as external
factors may also influence domestic ones. However, this gives a good gene-
ral theoretical background to the empirical part of the analysis concerning
the repayment difficulties of indebted countries in the past two decades.
3. A summary of Previous Empirical Studies
Sachs and Berg (1988) are among those who investigate the likelihood of
default and the factors that cause a debt crisis. Their attempt was to find
a structural explanation to the debt crisis in the 1980s. They argue that 
the change in the terms of trade, the structure of foreign trade (share of
manufacturing vs. primary goods in total exports and the degree of commo-
dity diversification), the level of per capita income, and geographical location
of a country (to capture ”contagion effect“ in pure commercial bank lend-
ing), and openness, are the main factors that determine the likelihood of
default. The dependent variable is rescheduling of external debt owed to
commercial banks during the period 1982–87. They have 15countries, which
rescheduled their debt and 20 countries that did not in their regression.
Using a probit model, their findings indicate the following: The more open
economies tend to have a low ratio of total debt service to exports ratio due
to rapidly growing export revenues and therefore are less likely to resche-
dule. Higher income inequality increases the probability of debt service dif-
ficulties. High-income countries are less likely to reschedule since the costs
of doing so (less access to new loans at friendly terms) are high. Moreover,
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tures (Sachs – Berg, 1988, p. 24). The surprising result is that the terms of
trade turned out insignificant. This is in constrast to the theoretical argument
that a loss in the terms of trade may lead to debt repayment difficulties.
Woller and Philips (1996) empirically investigate the debt-servicing dif-
ficulties of 29 developing countries, most of them from Latin America du-
ring the period between 1985 and 1993. The dependent variable is total debt
reduction. Using a logit model, they show that debt reduction is inversely
related to the rate of inflation, ratio of exports of goods and services to GDP,
the change in the terms of trade, interest arrears, and positively to GDP
per capita, ratio of exports to GDP, and ratio of current account balance to
GDP. Some of their covariates appear to be suffering from a multicolinea-
rity problem. For instance, taking the ratio of exports to GDP and current
account to GDP may lead to a serious problem as these variables are highly
related.
McFadden et. al. (1985, in (Smith – Cuddington, 1985)) examined the de-
terminants of debt-service difficulties across 93 developing countries in 
the period 1971–82. Using a probit model, they find out that the probabi-
lity of rescheduling is a decreasing function of total reserves to GDP ratio,
GNPper capita, and its real growth. In contrast, the likelihood of reschedul-
ing is an increasing function of imports to GDP ratio, debt service due to
exports ratio, and the change in the real exchange rate.5
Marchesi’s (2000) empirical strategy was aimed at testing the existence
of the effect of adopting the IMF programme on the subsequent concession
of a debt rescheduling. The central hypothesis is that those countries that
adopt an IMF programme will be more likely to obtain debt rescheduling
possibilities than those that do not.6 The period under investigation is
1985–94 and this is because, as she puts it ”international debt strategy has
shifted towards a policy more oriented to concede restructuring (respect to
one more oriented to providing new loans) only in the eighties“ (p. 15). 
The dependent variable chosen is total debt rescheduled. Using a bivaria-
te probit model, Marchesi (2000) finds that rescheduling is negatively and
strongly related to the rate of growth of the government consumption, 
the level of investment, the level of exports, and the disequilibrium in 
the balance of payments. In contrast, there is a strong and positive relation
between rescheduling and the two dummy variables that are included: 
The adoption of the IMF programme and participation in the Baker and Bra-
dy Plan. Finally, the total external debt turns out to be negatively and sig-
nificantly related to rescheduling, implying that ”the more a country is in-
debted, the smaller the probability that it will obtain an arrangement with
the Fund“ (p. 23).
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5 The change in the real exchange was used as a proxy for capital flight, where they give 
the value of 0 for country observations with flexible exchange rate regime, while they take the
growth of the real exchange rate for those with pegged exchange rate regime. See also (Hadji-
vassiliou, 1987) for debt repayment problem discussion.
6 The change in the real exchange was used as a proxy for capital flight, where they give 
the value of 0 for country observations with flexible exchange rate regimes, while they take 
the growth of the real exchange rate for those with pegged exchange rate regimes. See also (Had-
jivassiliou, 1987) for debt repayment problem discussion.
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the 1976–87 period, examines the determinants of rescheduling (or simply
the factors that affect debt repayment capacity). His results seem to sug-
gest that debt service ratio, reserve to imports ratio, the debt service pay-
ments to capital inflow ratio, the growth rate of GDP, the rate of domestic
inflation, and the ratio of net government deficit to GDP ratio are impor-
tant determinants of debt repayment capacity.
4. Econometric Specification and Data Description
In order to measure the likelihood of debt service difficulties, we esti-
mated the parameters using a logit model. As a comparison a probit model
is used.7 Later we switch to a fixed effects logit model to control for coun-
try-specific factors and time-specific factors that account for debt service
difficulties. The notations and procedure of estimation of the logit model
that we use here is adapted from Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998).8 This
method is basically a multivariate regression technique which is used to
make predictions if we have a binary (dichotomous) dependent variable.
In the logit model, our focus is to figure out the probability of debt ser-
vice difficulties (total debt rescheduled used as a proxy for debt servicing
difficulties) and the factors that are responsible for this difficulty to occur.
Like in (Pindyck – Rubinfeld, 1998), using a logit approach, the probability
of rescheduling total external debt ( Pi) can be estimated as:
1
pi = ––––––––––––  (1)
1 + e
–(α+βXi)
Here the individual Pi cannot be observed but from the (World Bank,
2000), it is possible to have information about countries that have resche-
duled their external debt and those that do not. Unfortunately, such data
is available only between the periods 1989–98. X is a vector of variables
that impact on the debt capacity of debtor countries and e is the base of na-
tural logarithm of both sides of the equation. The dependent variable, Yi,
is composed of two values: 1 for a country that has for some reason resche-
duled its total debt payment and 0 for the one that was lucky to escape
rescheduling during a given year. α and β are unknown parameters that
should be estimated by the model. Following Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998),
Maddala (1983) and Ngassam (1992), among others, if the logit model with
individual observations has been chosen, the maximum likelihood estima-
tion (MLE) would be the most appropriate estimation technique to be used.9
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7 The two models should produce similar results, except that the scale of the coefficients will
differ.
8 However, a broader discussion of this and other limited dependent variable can be found in
(Pindyck – Rubinfield, 1998) and (Maddala, 1983). Ngassman (1992) also follows exactly the same
procedure.
9 All parameter estimators are consistent, and asymptotically efficient. In addition, all para-
meter estimators are known to be (asymptotically) normal, so that the analogy of the regres-
sion t test can be applied (Pindyck – Rubinfeld, 1998).
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n1 countries that have rescheduled their external debt and n2 countries that
managed to pay back their external debt. Therefore, we have (n1 + n2 = N)
countries in total. We ordered the data in such a way that the n1 observa-
tions are associated with rescheduling and the n2 countries with non-
-rescheduling. The maximum likelihood function that is subject to maxi-
mization will then have the following form:
L = Prob(Y1,...., YN) = Prob(Y1)....Prob(YN)   (2)
Recognizing that the probability of a country falling in the non-reschedul-
ing group is simply 1 minus the probability of its being in the rescheduling
group, and using n to stand for the product of a number of independent vari-
ables, the likelihood function reduces to:
n1         NN
L = P1....Pn (1 – Pn1+1)...(1 – PN) = Π P i Π (1 – Pi) = Π Pi
Yi (1 – Pi)(1–Yi) (3)
i=1     i=n1+1                     i=1
The last expression indicates that Yi = 1 for the n1 observations, and 0
for the n2 observations. It is now time to maximize the logarithms of L by
substituting the logistic probability function from the equation (1). It is first
necessary to note that
1         1+ –(α+βxi)–1           –(α+βxi) 1                 1
1 – Pi= 1 – –––––––– = –––––––––– = + ––––––––– = ––––––––––– = ––––––––
1+ –(α+βxi) 1+ –(α+βxi) 1+ –(α+βxi) 1+(1/ –(α+βxi)) 1+ (α+βxi)
Following Ngassam (1992, p. 11), this implies that:
n1                     N
log L = Σ log Pi + Σ log (1 – Pi)
i=1                 i=n1+1
In order to obtain the slope estimators of ^ α, and ^ β there is a need for a par-
tial differentiation of log L with respect to the two unknown parameters (α,
and β), and setting the outcome equal to zero, and solve:
 (ln L)     
n  Pi/ α
N  Pi/ α
––––––– = Σ –––––––– – Σ ––––––– = 0
δα i=1 Pi i=n1+1 1 – Pi
 (ln L)     
n  Pi/ β
N  Pi/ β
––––––– = Σ –––––– – Σ –––––– = 0
 β i=1 Pi i=n1+1 1 – Pi
To test the significance of all or a subset of the coefficients in the MLE
logit model, we use the standard  -square distribution and likelihood ratio
tests.
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The data consists of 48 countries that have rescheduled during
the 1989–98 period and 14 countries that have not rescheduled their ex-
ternal debt service obligation. The number of countries chosen for this ana-
lysis purely depended on the availability of data. The dependent variable
is the total amount rescheduled in the 1989–98 period. The explanatory
variables, their definitions and sources are in Table 2. Unlike most previ-
ous researchers, we use lagged values of all the covariates to avoid the no-
toriously known simultaneity problem. Interest payments and total debt
service payments have been deflated by exports. While capital inflows have
been deflated by total debt services payments due, reserves are deflated by
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TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics of the Determinants on Debt Servicing Difficulties (1989–98)
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TDSX 600 21.22 13.42 0 152
RESIMP 594 3.25 3.15 0 25
LGDP 599 7.43 0.82 5.61 9.22
GDPG 600 3.67 5.61 –50.2 34.4
IMPGDP 600 36.67 20.83 4.6 129.8
OECDG 570 1.85 1.22 –1.67 4.78
LTOTG 599 0.01 2.72 –15.84 18.02
CAPTDS 600 341.91 2 012.16 –210.54 45 923
TABLE 4 Correlation Matrix




RESIMP –0.155* –0.08* 1.00
(0.000) (0.04)
LGDP –0.159* –0.053 0.215* 1.00
(0.000) (0.19) (0.000)
GDPG –0.01* –0.017 0.136* 0.131* 1.00
(0.009) (0.68) (0.000) (0.001)
IMPGDP –0.126* –0.331* –0.114* 0.071 0.059 1.00
(0.002) (0.000) (0.08) (0.14) (0.14)
OECDG –0.032 0.044 –0.032 0.016 0.075 0.022 1.00
(0.43) (0.28) (0.43) (0.69) (0.07) (0.59)
LTOT –0.002 –0.034 0.017 0.000 –0.024 –0.031 0.004 1.00
(0.95) (0.40) (0.67) (0.99) (0.55) (0.44) (0.30)
CAPTDS 0.076 –0.109* –0.037 –0.152* –0.198* –0.016 0.028 0.068 1.00
(0.06) (0.00) (0.36) (0.000) (0.000) (0.68) (0.49) (0.09)
Notes: *significant at 5% level
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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in the size of developing countries. Tables 3 and 4 contain descriptive statis-
tics and a correlation matrix for the covariates included in this study, re-
spectively.
6. Results of the Regression and Discussion
In order to measure the likelihood of debt service difficulties, we esti-
mated the parameters using a logit model. As a comparison a probit model
was used. Later we switch to a fixed effects logit model to control for coun-
try-specific and time-specific factors that may account for debt service re-
payment capacity. The reason is that a countrys’ debt repayment potential
may also be influenced by factors other than those that current empirical
literature focuses on. The second reason is that in a simple cross-section
approach, it is not possible to control for time-specific factors that may ham-
per the repayment capacity of indebted countries. To our knowledge, these
have not been taken care of by current empirical literature.
The empirical results for the causes of the debt crisis in the 1980s and
1990s have been presented in tables 5 to 8. In Table 5 we presented the re-
sults for the cross-section pooled time series logit and probit models, where
columns 1–4 stand for the logit while 5–8 stand for the probit model. 
The results of Table 5 suggest the following: Higher total debt service to 
exports ratio (TDSX) increases the probability of debt-service difficulties 
and leads to rescheduling. This is because higher debt service exhausts 
the amount of resources and little is left over for investment and growth.
A higher amount of reserves to imports ratio (RESIMP) decreases the pro-
bability of debt rescheduling since now an indebted country has enough fo-
reign exchange to meet its external debt obligation. Higher real income per
capita (LGDP) and growth in real income (GDPG) and import to GDP ra-
tio (IMPGDP) decrease the probability of rescheduling. The reason is that
higher income per capita and GDP growth that are indicators of credit-
worthiness should enable an indebted country to generate resources to meet
its foreign obligation.10 On the other hand, the significance of IMPGDPvari-
able is, to a great extent, linked to the degree of openness of an indebted
country to international trade. An indebted country that is open to inter-
national trade is unlikely to default or demand for rescheduling as the pe-
nalty (trade sanction, embargo and trade credit) might be too damaging. In
column 2, we added the growth of OECD trade partners (OECDG) to cap-
ture the impact of this on the debt-servicing behavior of indebted countries.
The results suggest, though not statistically significant, that higher growth
of OECD trade partners decreases the probability of rescheduling (debt-ser-
vicing difficulties).11
Putting aside the statistically insignificance of the coefficient on OECDG
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10 All covariates are lagged by one year to minimize possible simultaneity problem.
11 As McFadden, et al. (1985, p. 188, in (Smith – Cuddington, 1985)) rightly puts it, ”the signi-
ficance of income may reflect both the ability to pay and the presence of a government infra-
structure adequate to control trade and exchange activities“.
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higher growth of OECD trade partners would mean higher export revenue
for indebted countries which should enable them to pay their external debt
back when due. Second, the growth of this group could also create a better
economic environment for debt relief.12 In column 3, we added the percen-
tage change in terms of trade (LTOTG) that captures the welfare loss or
gain in international trade, which affects export revenue. The positive sign
on LTOTG (though not statistically significant) may suggest that an im-
provement in the terms of trade increases the probability of debt-service
difficulties, hence the demand for rescheduling, a result that should be in-
terpreted rather as anomalous. Finally, the ratio of capital inflows to total
debt service due (CAPTDS) may indicate that higher inflows of capital re-
lative to the amount of scheduled debt service payment decreases the pro-
bability of rescheduling.
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12 However, as Hajivassiliou (1987) argues, higher growth in OECD countries may reflect 
the level of investment in these countries which may crowd out lending to developing countries.
TABLE 5 Regression Results for Cross–section Pooled Analysis (1989–98)
(dependent variable 1 for countries that rescheduled and 0 otherwise in all 
the regressions)
Variable
Logit Model Estimates Probit Model Estimates
12345678
CONST 2.336*** 2.34*** 2.339*** 1.266 1.44*** 1.459*** 1.453*** 0.782
(2.8) (2.8) (2.8) (1.29) (2.8) (2.8) (2.8) (1.3)
TDSX 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.218*** 0.027*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.017***
(2.9) (2.8) (2.8) (3.3) (3.0) (2.8) (2.9) (3.3)
RESIMP –0.107 –0.069 –0.07* –0.079* –0.066*** –0.043* –0.044* –0.049*
(–2.8) (–1.6) (–1.6) (–1.8) (–2.9) (–1.6) (–1.6) (–1.9)
LGDPC –0.301*** –0.337*** –0.336*** –0.221* –0.181*** –0.209*** –0.209*** –0.137
(–2.8) (–3.1) (–3.1) (–1.8) (–2.8) (–3.1) (–3.1) (–1.8)
GDPG –0.029* –0.027* –0.027* –0.025 –0.018* –0.018* –0.017* –0.015
(–1.8) (–1.7) (–1.6) (–1.4) (–1.8) (–1.7) (–1.6) (–1.4)
IMPGDP –0.01** –0.0001 –0.0001 0.0001 –0.006** –0.0002 –0.0001 0.0002
(–2.1) (–0.2) (–0.00) (0.1) (–2.2) (–0.0) (–0.0) (0.0)
OECDG –0.07 –0.08 –0.088 –0.048 –0.049 –0.054
(–1.1) (–1.1) (–1.22) (–1.1) (–1.1) (–1.2)
TOTG 0.003 0.02 0.002 0.012
(0.52) (0.6) (0.53) (0.6)
CAPTDS 0.0004** 0.0003*
(1.9) (1.9)
PseudoR2 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05
N 593 563 563 563 593 563 563 563
Notes: The asterisks *, **, and *** represent significance at 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, and are applied 
to all the regressions in this paper.
In all regressions, the numbers in paranthesis are t-statistics.
All the variables are lagged by one year.
Sources: Except the annual GDP growth that was taken from (Easterly et al., 2002), all the other covariates have
been own calculations of the author.
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ments to exports ratio (INTX) instead of total debt service ratio (TDSX).
The reason is that it is actually interest payment ratios that capture 
the pure (net) impact of swings in the interest rate and represents the ac-
tual cost of external debt. While most of the covariates remain the same as
that of Table 5, the results for INTX suggest that higher interest payments
strongly increase the likelihood of rescheduling.
While the discussion so far suggests that the covariates in Tables 5 and 6
(interest payments, total debt service ratio, income per capita and growth
in income, capital inflows to scheduled debt service payments and reserves
to imports ratio) are key determinants of external debt service difficulties,
there are some caveats that need to be addressed. The crux of the matter
here is that countries may encounter debt-service difficulties because of se-
veral other problems. As many argue, there are substantial economic, so-
cial and institutional differences across developing countries, which may
affect their debt service capacities. Moreover, developing countries are dif-
ferent in their colonial heritage, geopolitical and strategic significance, po-
litical stability and other factors that may determine their creditworthiness
and the potential bargaining power to manage debt-servicing difficulties.
The most usual empirical strategy to address the issues mentioned above
is to use the fixed-effects model and in this case, the fixed-effects logit model
that allows to control for country-specific factors. The results of the re-
gression for the fixed-effects logit model are presented in Tables 7 and 8.
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TABLE 6 Regression Results for the Likelihood of Debt–service Difficulties (1989–98)
(Dependent variable is 1 for countries that have rescheduled and 0 otherwise.)
Variable
Logit Model Estimates Probit Model Estimates
12345678
CONST 2.269*** 2.288*** 2.291*** 1.115 1.406*** 1.421*** 1.415*** 0.697
(2.7) (2.8) (2.8) (1.1) (2.8) (2.8) (2.8) (1.2)
INTX 0.11*** 0.111*** 0.111*** 0.123*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.077***
(5.6) (5.5) (5.6) (5.9) (5.7) (5.7) (5.7) (6.1)
RESIMP –0.117*** –0.085* –0.086* –0.099** –0.07*** –0.053** –0.054** –0.062**
(–2.9) (–1.9) (–1.9) (–2.2) (–2.9) (–1.97) (–2.0) (–2.3)
LGDPC –0.387*** –0.426 –0.427*** –0.301** –0.240*** –0.265*** –0.265*** –0.188**
(–3.4) (–3.7) (–3.7) (–2.4) (–3.5) (–3.8) (–3.8) (–2.4)
GDPG –0.024 –0.021 –0.021 –0.018 –0.015 –0.013 –0.013 –0.011
(–1.5) (–1.3) (–1.3) (–1.0) (–1.5) (–1.3) (–1.3) (–1.0)
IMPGDP 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.008 –0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005
(–0.7) (1.2) (1.2) (1.1) (–0.8) (1.1) (1.2) (1.3)
OECDG –0.091 –0.094 –0.010 –0.055 –0.057 –0.062
(–1.2) (–1.3) (–1.4) (–1.2) (–1.3) (–1.4)
TOTG 0.018 0.027 0.003 0.016
(0.6) (0.8) (0.6) (0.8)
CAPTDS 0.0005** 0.0003**
(2.1) (2.2)
PseudoR2 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.09
N 593 563 563 563 593 563 563 563
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and IMPGDP are indeed major determinants of debt-service difficulties,
hence the level of rescheduling across developing countries in the 1980s and
1990s. It is also important to note that INTX and income per capita (LGDP)
continued to be the strongest explanation for debt-servicing difficulty across
countries. The marginal effects (Table 9) also confirm that debt service
(mainly interest payments), reserves to GDP ratio, income per capita and
imports to GDP ratio be the core determining factors behind the failure of
indebted countries to service their contractual international debt obliga-
tions.
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TABLE 7 Regression Results for Fixed–effects Logit Model (1989–98)
(Dependent variable is 1 for countries that have rescheduled and 0 otherwise.)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
TDSX 0.039*** 0.028* 0.401*** 0.028* 0.042*** 0.031* 0.051*** 0.039**
(2.5) (1.79) (2.5) (1.81) (2.6) (1.92) (3.10) (2.35)
RESIMP 0.152 0.302*** 0.150 0.306*** 0.135 0.291*** 0.130 0.279**
(1.5) (2.62) (1.4) (2.66) (1.30) (2.51) (1.20) (2.38)
LGDP –3.53** –3.15** –3.51** –3.09** –3.38** –2.99* –2.32 –1.79
(–2.3) (–2.01) (–2.3) (–1.98) (–2.20) (–1.93) (–1.50) (–1.10)
GDPG 0.017 0.023 0.017 0.022 0.019 0.025 0.047* 0.049**
(0.7) (1.01) (0.7) (1.00) (0.8) (1.12) (1.90) (2.01)
IMPGDP –0.043* 0.013 –0.042* 0.028 –0.039 0.029 –0.059** 0.005
(–1.7) (0.47) (–1.9) (0.77) (–1.50) (0.94) (–2.20) (0.15)
OECDG –0.024 –0.014 –0.036 –0.014 –0.055 –0.009
(–0.2) (–0.85) (0.40) (–0.85) (–0.60) (–0.56)
TOTG 0.036 0.009 0.036 0.009
(0.80) (1.03) (0.8) (0.95)
CAPTDS 0.0006*** 0.0005**
(2.60) (1.97)
dummy90 –1.313 –0.139 –0.117 –0.128
(–0.26) (–0.27) (–0.83) (–0.24)
dummy91 –0.307 –0.307 –0.330 –0.314
(–0.58) (–0.58) (–0.62) (–0.58)
dummy92 –0.354 –0.366 –0.344 –0.342
(–0.65) (–0.67) (–0.63) (–0.61)
dummy93 –0.501 –0.513 –0.497 –0.468
(–0.88) (–0.90) (–0.87) (–0.80)
dummy94 –1.64*** –1.66*** –1.64*** –1.57***
(–2.83) (–2.86) (–2.80) (–2.63)
dummy95 –1.130* –1.139* –1.171* –1.375**
(–1.88) (–1.89) (–1.94) (–2.22)
dummy96 –1.272** –1.191* –1.237** –1.174*
(–2.08) (–1.93) (–1.98) (–1.87)
dummy97 –1.783*** –1.745*** –1.759*** –1.719***
(–2.84) (–2.78) (–2.79) (–2.67)
dummy98 –1.69*** –1.685*** –1.717*** –1.622**
(–2.65) (–2.64) (–2.68) (–2.46)
No. Obs. 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425
s_124_140  18.4.2005  12:37  Stránka 1367. Conclusion and the Policy Implication of This Study
This paper was aimed at empirically addressing the factors accounting for
the debt repayment difficulties of indebted developing countries in the 1980s
and 1990s. In this respect, the main objective was to empirically explore the fac-
tors that increase the likelihood of debt rescheduling.
To  answer this question, several empirical strategies were employed.
Using the cross-section pooled time series probit, and logit, models and fixed
effects logit model, empirical findigs suggest that the core factors behind
poor nations’debt-servicing difficulties are the scheduled external debt ser-
vice payments (or interest payments), the amount of international reserves
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TABLE 8 Regression Results for Fixed–effects Logit Model (1989–98)
(Dependent variable is 1 for countries that have rescheduled and 0 otherwise.)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
INTX 0.192*** 0.153*** 0.193*** 0.154*** 0.200*** 0.157*** 0.221*** 0.179***
(4.20) (3.28) (4.41) (3.29) (4.50) (3.37) (4.8) (3.68)
RESIMP 0.171 0.277** 0.166 0.283** 0.141 0.264** 0.137 0.251**
(1.6) (2.34) (1.5) (2.39) (1.3) (2.19) (1.2) (2.05)
LGDP –2.884* –2.602* –2.872* –2.555 –2.722* –2.449 –1.518 –1.246
(–1.9) (–1.63) (–1.8) (–1.61) (–1.70) (–1.55) (–0.9) (–0.75)
GDPG 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.048* 0.046*
(0.6) (0.86) (0.7) (0.85) (0.8) (1.0) (1.9) (1.88)
IMPGDP –0.022 0.016 –0.022 0.026 –0.017 0.032 –0.038 0.007
(–0.8) (0.55) (–0.8) (0.84) (–0.6) (1.01) (–1.3) (0.21)
OECDG –0.035 –0.014 –0.051 –0.015 –0.071 –0.009
(–0.41) (–0.87) (–0.5) (–0.87) (–0.7) (–0.56)
TOTG0 .010 0.01 0.047 0.009
(1.1) (1.1) (0.9) (0.97)
CAPTDS 0.0006*** 0.0004*
(2.4) (1.93)
dummy90 –0.087 –0.098 –0.082 –0.094
(–0.17) (–0.19) (–0.16) (–0.18)
dummy91 –0.143 –0.139 –0.164 –0.122
(–0.27) (–0.26) (–0.3) (–0.22)
dummy92 –0.189 –0.199 –0.181 –0.173
(–0.34) (–0.36) (–0.32) (–0.3)
dummy93 –0.255 –0.263 –0.237 –0.191
(–0.44) (–0.45) (–0.4) (–0.32)
dummy94 –1.345** –1.362** –1.328** –1.225**
(–2.23) (–2.26) (–2.19) (–1.97)
dummy95 –0.757 –0.767 –0.800 –0.998
(–1.21) (–1.22) (–1.27) (–1.55)
dummy96 –0.872 –0.783 –0.831 –0.741
(–1.36) (–1.21) (–1.28) (–1.13)
dummy97 –1.331** –1.289** –1.289* –1.193*
(–2.01) (–1.95) (–1.94) (–1.75)
dummy98 –1.244* –1.238* –1.272* –1.150*
(–1.85) (–1.84) (–1.88) (–1.65)
No. Obs. 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425
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come, the ratio imports to GDP, and the amount of capital inflows relative
to the total debt service payments due ratio. It is important to note that
the level of income per capita (which captures the level of poverty, among
other things) and interest payments (which represent the actual cost of ex-
ternal debt and capture swings in international interest rates) are the most
profound determinants of debt-servicing difficulties across developing na-
tions in the 1980s and 1990s.
The policy implications of this study are relatively straightfor-
ward: The results here and other studies seem to suggest that poverty and
past accumulated debt are the cardinal factors responsible for the failure
of poor nations in meeting their contractual debt obligations. This may seem
to support the call for debt relief for poor nations, as further supply of loans
to these nations would simply lead them to a notoriously known problem of
„circular financing“, hence, taking more expensive fresh loans to pay back
cheaper old ones, leaving the circle unbroken, and poor nations poor for-
ever. In this context, the new HIPCs’ initiative by the IMF and World Bank
should be recognized as a plausible start towards a real solution to the debt
crisis of poor nations. Nevertheless, without a sincere policy change both in
developing and developed countries, debt relief on its own will not guaran-
tee a sustainable economic recovery across indebted poor nations in 
the decades ahead.
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TABLE 9 Marginal Effects after Logit (Cross–section Pooled Time Series) (1989–98)
(Numbers in parantheses are t–statistics.)
Variable 1 23456
INTX 0,029*** 0,03*** 0,031***
(5,89) (5,93) (5,89)
TDSX 0,007*** 0,007*** 0,007***
(3,38) (3,41) (3,29)
RESIMP –0,028*** –0,028*** –0,022** –0,031*** –0,031*** –0,027**
(–2,92) (–2,93) (–1,95) (–3,05) (–3,07) (–2,33)
LGDP –0,047 –0,046 –0,006 –0,066** –0,065** –0,065**
(–1,57) (–1,54) (–1,49) (–2,16) (–2,12) (–2,04)
GDPG –0,006 –0,007 –0,006 –0,005 –0,005 –0,005
(–1,52) (–1,54) (–1,49) (–1,17) (–1,20) (–1,13)
IMPGDP –0,006** –0,002** 0,002 –0,001 –0,001 0,004*
(–1,98) (–1,96) (1,00) (–0,68) (–0,66) (1,88)
CAPTDS 0,0001* 0,0001* 0,0001* 0,0001** 0,0001** 0,0001*
(1,89) (1,93) (1,73) (2,8) (2,14) (1,97)
LTOTG 0,004 0,004 0,005 0,006
(0,52) (0,6) (0,67) (0,78)
OECDG –0,002 –0,02
(–1,33) (–1,40)
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Why Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Have Failed
to Pay Back Their Debt?
An empirical investigation
MENBERE Workie Tiruneh – Institute of Slovak and World Economies, Slovak Academy of Sciences, 
Bratislava, Slovakia (menberew2000@yahoo.com)
This paper, in using cross-section pooled logit, probit, and fixed-effects logit mo-
dels, empirically explores the main factors affecting the rescheduling of contractual
debt-service payments by heavily indebted poor countries (HICPs) in the late
1980s and the 1990s. The results seem to suggest that HIPCs past external debt,
per-capita income level, GDPgrowth rate, trade openness, foreign-currency reserves,
and capital inflows are core factors affecting debt servicing
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